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A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
ELLEN RUST PEIRCEt

RICHARD A. MANN ft
BARRY S. ROBERTS-t
I. INTRODUCTION

D

ESPITE extensive erosion of the common law principle of
freedom of contract,' a stubborn progeny survives today-the
at will contract of employment. Under this common law theory, a
contract of employment for other than a definite term is deemed
to be terminable at will by either party.2 Accordingly, employers
may "dismiss their employees at will for good cause, for no cause
or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of
legal wrong." 3 The employment at will rule has been recognized
t Assistant Professor, Legal Studies, School of Business Administration.
University of North Carolina. B.A. Bryn Mawr College, 1971; J.D. Duke Law
School, 1976.
ttAssociate Professor, Legal Studies, School of Business Administration,
University of North Carolina. B.S. University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 1968; J.D. Yale Law School, 1973.
"-Associate
Professor, Legal Studies, School of Business Administration,
University of North Carolina. B.S. Pennsylvania State University, 1970; J.D.
University of Pennsylvania, 1973; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1976.
1. For a discussion of the demise of the common law principle of freedom
of contract, see L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965); G.
"GiLmoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
2. See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964) (although plaintiff had been employed
by his employer for twenty-eight years, there was no implied contract of future
employment and employer was free to fire plaintiff at will); Harper v. Southern
Coal 8c Coke Co., 73 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1934) (because employment contract
contained no provision on the duration of employment, and empIoyer did not
violate any statute, employer's termination of employee was justified); Warden
v. Hinds, 163 F. 201 (4th Cir. 1908) (a hiring for one year may not be presumed from a letter promising employment and setting forth compensation,
but not duration).
3. Payne v. Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (dictum),
'overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134
<1915). See also I C. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
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in treatises on contract,4 tort,5 and agency 8 law and is generally
accepted in judicial decisions in this country.7 In the last decade,
however, a growing number of exceptions to the rule have developed based on various tort theories,8 implied contract theories 9
and public policy."' In addition, a number of federal 11 and state 12
statutes enacted in the last fifty years have also served to limit the
effects of the rule. In particular, the establishment of collective
bargaining through union representation and the protection thereby
afforded certain classes of employees have curtailed the impact of
the employment at will doctrine.' 3 Nonetheless, employees who
are not protected by statutory provisions or a collective bargaining
agreement may be discharged at any time, for any reason, without
legal recourse unless relief is available under one of several limited
SERVANT § 159 (2d ed. 1913); Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified
Duration, 42 COLuM. L. REV. 107 (1942).
4. 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967).
5. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS

§ 129,

at 946 (4th ed. 1971).

6. The Restatement of Agency adopts the rule that if no term of employment is specified the contract of employment is terminable at will by either
party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §442 (1958). Comment a to this
section of the Restatement states that unless a stated term is specified and
consideration given, other than a general promise to employ or to serve, then
the agreement will be interpreted as one of employment only to the extent
either party wishes. Id. § 442 Comment a.
7. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.
2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (employer was free to terminate
at will the indefinite employment contract of business agent); Land v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 231, 203 S.E.2d 316 (1973) (flight service agent's employment contract for indefinite period of time is terminable at will of either
party); Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d 24 (1958)
(employment contract for indefinite period of time is terminable at will of
either party); Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d
249 (1964) (employment contract of general manager of lumber company providing for payments based on percentage of profits so long as matters proved
satisfactory amounted to contract for indefinite period that was terminable at
the will of either party); Webster v. Schauble, 65 Wash. 2d 849, 400 P.2d 292
(1965) (discharge of employee from brokerage house was valid despite lack of
just cause for the termination and severe injury to the employee). See generally 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 43 (1970); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3D 271
(1975).
8. For a discussion of these tort theories, see notes 158-229 and accompanying text infra.
9. For a discussion of the implied contract theories, see notes 123-57 and
accompanying text infra.
10. For a discussion of these public policy theories, see notes 166-229 and

accompanying text infra.
11. For a discussion of the federal statutes limiting the employment at will
rule, see notes 37-71 and accompanying text infra.
12. For a discussion of the state statutes limiting the employment at will
rule, see notes 72-86 and accompanying text infra.
13. For a brief discussion of the protection afforded by collective bargain-

ing agreements, see notes 66-69 and accompanying text infra.
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judicial exceptions. This situation stands in sharp contrast to the
legal milieu in other developed industrial countries that have
adopted statutes specifically protecting employees from dismissal at
14
will by their employers.
In recent years, the employment at will doctrine has been extensively criticized and a number of different recommendations for
modifying or abrogating the doctrine have been made. 15 Notwithstanding the variety of approaches suggested by the commentators
to modify the harsh effect of the at will doctrine, virtually all 16
agree that the doctrine is an anachronism and should be abandoned.
This article will first describe the origins of the rule. Then it will
analyze the extent and effectiveness of the statutory limitations currently placed on the rule and review statutory alternatives under
the laws of several foreign countries. It will also closely examine
the judicial approaches to restricting the rule and analyze its underlying economic and social justifications. Finally, the article will
propose reforms to address the critical problems presented by the
employment at will doctrine.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE AT WILL DOCTRINE

Prior to the industrial revolution in the late nineteenth
century, the law of employment in the United States was statusbased.' 7 The principles of status derived from the relationship of
the lord to the servant under the feudal system and encompassed a
14. Kahn-Freund, Labor Law and Social Security, in I
PRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET:

A

LEGAL PROFILE

AMERICAN ENTER-

297, 428 (E. Stein

& T. Nicholson eds. 1960). For a discussion of the stautory protection from
dismissal at will in other countries, see notes 88-122 and accompanying text
infra.

15. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404
(1967); Murg 8c Scharman, Employment at Will: Do Exceptions Overwhelm
the Rule, 23 B.C.L. REV. 319 (1982); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers,

Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA.

L. REV. 481 (1976); Note, A Common LawAction for the Abusively Discharged

Employee, 26

HASTINGS

L.J. 1435 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A Common Law

Action]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Implied Rights]; Note, Protecting At Will. Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Protecting At Will
Employees]. See also Committee Report, At-Will Employment and the Prob-

lem of Unjust Dismissal, 36

RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE

CITY OF NEW YORK 170 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report].
16. But see Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised
by (1981).
At Will EmL.J. 265

ployees: A New Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB.
17. See A Common Law Action, supra note 15, at 1438 n.16; Protecting
At Will Employees, supra note 15, at 1824.
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structure based on paternalistic customs and reciprocal rights and
responsibilties created to secure the master-servant relationship. 8
Under these principles of status, a hiring at will was deemed to be
a hiring for one year 19 and dismissal during the term was required
20
to be for just cause.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the
United States experienced a surge in industrial growth and with it
a shift in political and social attitudes to an insistence "on freedom
of bargaining as the fundamental and indispensable requisite of
progress." 21 In Professor Maine's classic phrase, "the movement of
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status
to Contract." 22 The traditional protections of the status relationship were abruptly discarded during this period of laissez-faire.
The shift from status to contract had a profound impact upon
the employment relationship. In a treatise written during this
laissez-faire era, Horace Wood observed that a hiring for an indefinite period is presumptively a hiring at will:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much
a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was
for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time
[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is
the party may serve ....
terminable at the will of either party, and in this respect
there is no distinction between domestic and other
servants. 23
18. See A Common Law Action, supra note 15, at 1438.
19. Id. at 1439.
20. Id.
21. Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6

CORNELL

L.Q. 365, 366 (1921).

22. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (3d Am. ed. 1873) (emphasis in original).
23. H.

WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

§ 134 (1st

ed. 1877). Wood relied on the following cases: Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct.
Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 254 (1871); DeBriar
v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56
(1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871). Several commentators have pointed out that the four American cases which Wood cited
as authority for his rule do not in fact support his position. See, e.g., 4
Common Law Action, supra note 15, at 1439-40 n.21; Implied Rights, supra
note 15, at 341. For a recent analysis of Wood's authorities, see Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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This so-called "Wood's rule" was a direct manifestation of the
"pure" law of contract 24 adopted during this period which, as one
commentator suggests, evolved hand in hand with the adoption of
liberal economic and free market policies during this period of
rapid industrial growth: "In both theoretical models-that of the
law of contracts and that of liberal economics-parties could be
treated as individual economic units which in theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of decision .... . 25 This at will rule
enunciated by Wood conforms to the free market model of maximum freedom for individual action.
The operation of Wood's rule was presumptive; an employee
would be bound to his employer only if he and his employer clearly
intended him to be bound.26 If there were no such intent, then he
was free to sell his services to another, and likewise, the employer
was entitled to terminate the employment relationship at any time.
The employee's right to terminate the employment relationship at will provided a doctrinal basis for some courts to provide a
corresponding right to the employer. In affirming the employer's
24. See G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 6. Gilmore defines the pure law of
contract as an area of abstract relationships:
"Pure" contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and
person. It does not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought
and sold. .

.

. Contract law is abstraction-what is left in the law

relating to agreements when all particularities of person and subjectmatter are removed.
Id. (quoting L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 20). See also 0. W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW (1881) (containing a precise analysis of the doctrines of this
judicial period in American history); Protecting At Will Employees, supra
note 15, at 1825 n.53.
25. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 21.

26. See H. WOOD, supra note 23 and accompanying text. An employer
and his employee were required to observe all the formalities of contract law
in order to create a contract for employment which would not be subject to
the at will doctrine. Without such formal contractual arrangements, courts
were loathe to find that a nonterminable contract existed. See generally
G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 21-22. Establishing that the employee's employment was other than at will posed an enormous problem for the employee:
He must be able to prove that this contract, either expressly or
implicitly, has a definite duration. In situations where the employment relationship was contemplated by the employee to last for a lifetime, permanently and/or otherwise extended duration, he must show
that he has supplied an additional consideration to bind the employer
for such a time, or that an express provision clearly shows the parties'
intention to make the employment relationship endure for such time.
Failing this, the contract is terminable at will by the employer, with
or without cause, and no right of action for a wrongful discharge will
lie despite the nature of the dismissal. Where there is no definite
term of employment, and where the employee is not covered by any
relevant statute, he is defenseless against arbitrary or abusive discharge.
Note, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. Rrv.
211, 227-28 (1973).
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right to terminate at will, these courts pointed to the absence of
mutuality of obligation.2 1 Other courts denied employees the right
to continued employment upon the basis of absence of consideration. These courts held that the employee's work, in and of itself,
only entitled him to compensation for the work done, and could
not support a promise for job security.2 8 These two strict, formal
approaches to the contractual relationship were intended to promote and encourage the economic climate of entrepreneurship and
industrial growth. 29
The laissez-faire attitude which had fostered Wood's rule was
also prevalent in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court in the early twentieth century. In two cases the Supreme
Court upheld an employer's right to discharge an employee solely
because the employee had joined a union, thereby according recognition to Wood's rule. In the earlier case, Adair v. United States,3&
the Court affirmed the principle that "the right of the employ6 to
quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same
as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with
the services of such employ6." 31 The Court held that federal legislation which violates these rights by compelling an employer to
retain an employee in the absence of a contract "is an invasion of
the personal liberty as well as of the right of property guaranteed
by [the Fifth] Amendment." 82 Similarly, seven years later, the
Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas 33 held a state statute unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as a violation of individual property rights and an interference
27. See, e.g., Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69, 139
So. 760, 761 (1932). The Pitcher court observed that "[a]n employee is never
presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby cutting himself off from
all chances of improving his condition. . . . [I]f the contract of employment
be not binding on the employee . . . then it cannot be binding on the em-

ployer; there would be lack of 'mutuality'." Id. It is interesting to note that
application of the mutuality requirement in this context arises out of a purported concern for the freedom of the employee from bondage in his job.
See Blades, supra note 15, at 1419 n.71.
28. See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.,
197 Minn. 291, 295-300, 266 N.W. 872, 874-76 (1936) (because employee could
not prove that additional consideration passed to his employer when he
accepted employment, the promise of employment created only a hiring at
will). For a criticism of the additional consideration theory, see Protecting
At Will Employees, supra note 15, at 1819-20.
29. See ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 15, at 1826.
30. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
31. Id. at 174-75.
32. Id. at 172.
33. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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with an employer's freedom to contract. The majority opinion
clearly reflects the prevailing laissez-faire attitude of the period:
As to the interest of the employees, it is said by the
Kansas Supreme Court . . . to be a matter of common
knowledge that "employees, as a rule, are not financially
able to be as independent in making contracts for the sale
of their labor as are employers in making contracts of
purchase thereof." No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must be and will be inequalities
of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by
circumstances ....
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all
things are held in common, some persons must have more
property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of
private property without at the same time recognizing as
legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.34
Justice Day's dissent from the majority opinion in Coppage
presaged the view that would become dominant later in the
twentieth century:
I think that the act now under consideration, and kindred
ones, are intended to promote the same liberty of action for
the employee, as the employer confessedly enjoys. The law
should be as zealous to protect the constitutional liberty of
the employee as it is to guard that of the employer. A
principal object of this statute is to protect the liberty of
the citizen to make such lawful affiliations as he may desire
with organizations of his choice. It should not be necessary to the protection of the liberty of one citizen that the
same right in another citizen be abridged or destroyed. 5
III.

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

LIMITING THE

AT WILL DOCTRINE

Contract law in the twentieth century has gradually abandoned
the nineteenth century attitude of laissez-faire and its theory of unrestricted freedom of contract. This evolution is evident in increasing legislative restrictions which impinge on the parties' right
to contract as they see fit for lawful purposes. One of the areas
34. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 40 (Day, J., dissenting).
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which illustrates this trend most clearly is in the law of employment. 30
The earliest twentieth century legislation restricting the contractual aspect of the employment relationship was the Railway
Labor Act of 1926 (Railway Act) 87 which gave both railroad employers and employees the right to choose bargaining "without
interference, influence or coercion" 3s by one against the other.
The constitutionality of this statute and its limitations upon the
employer's right to discharge employees for their union activities
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Texas & New Orleans Railtroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks.89 In
this decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the Adair 40 and Coppage 4' opinions as "inapplicable":
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere
with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to
select its employees or to discharge them. The statute is
not aimed at this right of the employers but at the interference with the right of employees to have representatives
of their own choosing. As the carriers subject to the Act
have no constitutional right to interfere with the freedom
of the employees in making their selections, they cannot
42
complain of the statute on constitutional grounds.
This decision indicates the shift in jurisprudential thinking concerning an employer's fifth and fourteenth amendment freedoms.
While the Adair and Coppage decisions were premised on the
employer's fundamental right to do with his property as he saw fit,
including the indiscriminate hiring and firing of employees in connection with his property or business, the Texas & New Orleans
Railroad Co. decision indicates that the Court no longer held these
rights inviolate when certain counterbalancing social interests were
at stake, such as those reflected in the Railway Act.
36. See ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 15, at 1827-28.
37. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-162:
(1976)).
38. Ch. 347, § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)).
39. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
40. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). For a discussion of Adair, see text accompanyingnotes 30-32 supra.
41. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). For a discussion of Coppage, see text accompanying
notes 33-35 supra.

42. 281 U.S. at 570-71.
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In 1934, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 43 which provided employees with the right to unionize
free of intimidation or coercion from their employers, including
freedom from dismissal for engaging in union activities. 44 This.
legislation withstood constitutional attack in the landmark case of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.45 Of particular significance
was the Supreme Court's distinction in that case between the "normal" right of the employer to discharge an employee and the use
of that right "as a means of intimidation and coercion." 46 As one
commentator has noted, the suggestion in Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. that restrictions may be placed upon the employer's right to
discharge to prevent it from being used as a means of oppression
"is worthy of the most general application." 47
Since the enactment of the NLRA, additional federal legisla-tion has been passed that limits the employer's right of discharge,
both in the private and public sectors as well as in the unionized
and non-unionized sectors. In particular, these statutes fall inta
three categories: 1) those protecting certain employees from discriminatory discharge; 2) those protecting certain employees in.
their exercise of statutory rights; and 3) those protecting certain.
employees from discharge without cause.
An example of the first category is Title VII of the Civil Rights.
Act of 1964 48 which prohibits discrimination against employees
based on race, creed, religion, national origin or sex. 49 Although
its primary focus is upon hiring, promotion and seniority practices,5
this statute has been used in challenging the employer's right to,
43. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169

(1976)).

The pertinent language of this statute is found in § 157: "Employees

shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organiza-

tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
or other mutual aid or protection .
44. Id. §§ 157-158.
45. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In upholding the constitutionality of the NLRA,.
the Supreme Court was particularly concerned with the employee's lack of

equal bargaining power in contracting the terms of his employment with hi&
employer. Id. at 33. The Supreme Court, by upholding the NLRA, thereby
acknowledged that this imbalance in bargaining power is subject to legislative-

correction. Freedom of contract, therefore, no longer protects the employment
relation from minimum standards of fairness and consistency with sociat
reforms.
46. Id. at 45-46.
47. Blades, supra note 15, at 1418.

48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 SeSupp. IV 1980).
49. Id. § 2000e-2.
50. See id. See also Summers, supra note 15, at 493.
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discharge employees for discriminatory reasons. 51 Another example
is the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1970,52 under which an
employer may not dismiss an employee whose wages have been
made subject to garnishment for indebtedness.5 3 Additional federal
statutes protect other categories of employees such as the handicapped,5 4 public employees serving jury duty,15 and the aged.5 6
The statutes which fall in the second category protect employees from discharge for exercising their rights as provided in
the particular statutes. Protective provisions are included in the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,,5 the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970,58 and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.19
The above federal statutes restricting the employer's right of
discharge are aimed at employees who represent certain special
interest groups or employees warranting protection by virtue of
their exercise of certain statutory rights, and in most cases these
statutes protect absolutely against discharge. 60 There is, however,
a third class of federal statutes which do not protect absolutely
against dismissal, but protect only against dismissal "except for
cause." The employees who are protected under one of these
statutes are veterans who, upon release from military service, are
51. See, e.g., Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir.
1975) (employee threatened with discharge for becoming pregnant); Ashworth
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Va. 1975) (stewardess threatened
with dismissal for gaining weight). For other examples, see Summers, supra
note 15, at 493-94.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691f (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
53. Id. § 1674.
54. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (providing that
handicapped persons may not be excluded from federally funded programs).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (1976) (imposing criminal sanctions for threatening
dismissal of a federal employee because of jury service or because of race,
color, national origin or religion); 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (Supp. IV 1980) (prohibiting discharge for service as grand or petit juror in federal court).
56. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1976). This Act prohibits age discrimination against employees between the
ages of forty and seventy. It specifically proscribes discharging an employee
because of age. Id. § 623(a)(1).
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). This Act prohibits the discharge of or
discrimination against any employee for instituting action, inter alia, under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. § 215(a)(3).
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). This Act prohibits discharge of or discrimination against any employee for instituting an action, inter alia, under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Id. § 660(c) (1976).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This Act provides
protection from discharge for employees who exercise their retirement protection rights under the Act. Id. §§ 1132(a), 1140.
60. For a discussion of these statutes see notes 48-59 and accompanying
text supra.
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entitled to return to their former jobs and may not be dismissed
within one year except for cause."' Such cause has been defined
as that which "a fair-minded person may act upon" 62 and has been
compared to the type of protection afforded employees under collective bargaining agreements limiting dismissal to just cause.63
Employees covered by civil service laws and regulations are protected under another statute which provides that these employees
may not be dismissed except "for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service." 64
Federal employees have recently received statutory protection
against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information which the
employee reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule
or regulation, mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health
or safety. 65
In addition to these statutes, a sizeable segment of the United
States work force is contractually protected from unjust dismissal
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. Under Section 8(d)
of the NLRA, 66 unions and employers are required to bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of employment, which
typically include the terms upon which employees may be dismissed. 67 Most collective bargaining agreements contain language
prohibiting dismissal "without cause." This term has been defined
through numerous arbitration decisions concerning collective bargaining agreements. 68 Accordingly, accepted standards for what
constitutes an unjust dismissal have been developed over the years. 69
61. See Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38
U.S.C. § 2021 (1976).
62. Keserich v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 163 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir.
1947).
63. See Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
64. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503, 7513(a) (Supp.
IV 1980). See also authorities cited in Committee Report, supra note 15, at
206 n.101.
65. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (Supp. IV
1980).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). For the historical background of this Act,
see notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
67. Approximately 80% of all members of unions are protected from
unjust dismissal in collective bargaining agreements. Peck, supra note 15, at 8.
68. See Summers, supra note 15, at 521.
69. For a discussion of these standards, see Summers, supra note 15, at
499-508.
Although the majority of collective bargaining agreements state simply
that discharge may be made only for "just cause," courts further define this
standard by stating that this term includes such causes as refusing to obey
orders, working inefficiently, and breaking company rules. See, e.g., NLRB v.
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Although the United States has not adopted a statute protecting all employees from unjust dismissal, legislation of this nature
was introduced in Congress in 1980 as part of the Corporate
Democracy Act.70 Congress, however, failed to enact this bill.
Title IV of the Act would have amended the NLRA for the
purpose of protecting all employees from dismissal except for
"just cause":
It is further declared to be the policy of the United States
to protect employees in the security of their employment
by ensuring that they are not deprived of such employment on the basis of their having exercised their constitutional, civil, or other legal rights, or because of their
refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of
employment.
Employees shall have the further right to be secure in
their employment from discharge or adverse action with
respect to the terms or conditions of their employment
except for just cause.
The term "just cause" shall be defined in accordance
with the common law of labor contracts established pursuant to section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act,
except that such term shall not include (A) the exercise
of constitutional, civil, or legal rights; (B) the refusal to
engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of employment; (C) the refusal to submit to polygraph or other
similar tests; or (D) the refusal to submit to a search of
someone's person or property, other than routine inspec71
tions, conducted by an employer without legal process.

Mueller Brass Co., 509 F.2d 704, 711 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[i]f the specific employee

happens not only to break a Company regulation but also to evince a proUnion sentiment, that coincidence alone is not sufficient to destroy the just
cause for his discharge or suspension-'). Chemvet Laboratories, Inc. v. NLRB,

497 F.2d 445, 452 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing. NLRB v. Finesilver Mfg. Co., 400
F.2d 644, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1968)) (direct defiance of an employer's order is
good cause for discharge); NLRB v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2,
9 (5th Cir. 1958) ("[i]f an employee is both inefficient and engaged in union
activities, that is a coincidence that does not destroy the just cause for his
discharge").
As Professor Summers has observed, there are several fundamental concepts embodied in arbitrators' decisions interpreting "just cause." See Summers, supra note 15, at 501-08. First, employees must be made aware of what
activities have been proscribed by the employer. Id. at 502-03. Secondly,
"just cause" decisions have adopted the concept that all employees must be
treated equally. Id. at 503. Finally, employees must be treated with procedural fairness; the offense must be specified and proven.

Id. at 503-04.

70. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
71. Id. § 401.
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At. the state level there are a variety of statutes designed to
protect workers from discriminatory discharge for filing workmen's
compensation claims. 7 2

There are also numerous state statutes

which parallel federal legislation. For example, at least fifteen
states have adopted statutes similar to the NLRA 73 and many
states prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of such
factors as race, creed, nationality, sex or age. 74

In addition, a

number of states have statutes prohibiting discharge or other
punitive actions taken for the purpose of influencing voting or,
in some states, political activity. 75 At least one state has protected
state government employees from discipline for disclosure of public
76
interest information.
Michigan has recently enacted a Whistleblowers' Protection
77
Act which provides protection to employees who report a violation or a suspected violation of state, local or federal law or who
participate in hearings, investigations, legislative inquiries or court
actions. 7S It applies to all persons who have one or more employees, including agents of employers and the state or a political
subdivision of the state. 79 An employee is defined as a "person
who performs a service for wages or other remuneration under
a contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied," SO and
includes "a person employed by the state or a political subdivision
of the state except state classified civil service." 81 The Act pro72. See, e.g., N.Y.

LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82);
art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1982). See also Kelsay v.

WORK. COMP.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.

Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (Illinois Worker's Com-

pensation Act gives rise to a private cause of action for retaliatory discharge).
For the relevant provisions of the Illinois statute, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§§ 138.1 to .4 (1975).
73. See Summers, supra note 15, at 492.
74. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T

CODE

§ 12921 (West 1980) (declaring the oppor-

to seek and maintain employment without discrimination is a civil
right); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24K (West Supp. 1982-83) (prohibiting
discrimination against handicapped persons); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2)
(West 1966) (prohibiting discrimination by employers in hiring or treatment of
employees on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, or national origin.");
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982) (barring discrimination in employment
based on "age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital
tunity

status").
75. See, e.g.,

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108
(1973); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-154(3) (McKinney 1978). See also D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-2514(b) (1981).
76. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-103 to .5-105 (Supp. 1981).
77. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 15.361-.369 (1981).

78. Id. § 15.362.
79. Id. § 15.361(b).

80. Id. § 15.361(a).
81. Id.
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hibits the employer from discharging, threatening or otherwise
discriminating against an employee who reports a violation or
suspected violation unless the employee knows the report is false.As2
Civil actions for violations may be brought within 90 days for
injunctive relief or actual damages or both.8 3 A court may order,
as appropriate, reinstatement, the payment of back wages, full
reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, and costs of litigation including reasonable attorney fees and
witness fees or any combination of these remedies.8 4 Civil fines
of up to $500 may also be imposed."5 A similar statute was
recently enacted in Connecticut."
The statutory protection provided by federal and state legislation, nonetheless, remains fragmentary and incomplete. It is
estimated that between sixty and sixty-five percent of all American
employees are hired on an at will basis, while another twenty-two
percent are unionized and fifteen percent are federal or state
82. Id. § 15.362. This section provides:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the
employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is
about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected
violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law
of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States
to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false,
or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate
in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or
a court action.
Id.
83. Id. § 15.363(1).
84. Id. § 15.364.
85. Id. § 15.365.
86. See Conn. Pub. Act No. 82-289, 4 Conn. Leg. Serv. 1982 (West). This
Act, effective October 1, 1982, provides:
No employer shall discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize any
employee because the employee . . . reports . . . a violation or a suspected violation of any state or federal law or regulation or any
municipal ordinance or regulation to a public body, or because an
employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.
The provisions of this subsection shall not be applicable when the
employee knows that such report is false.
Any employee who is discharged, disciplined or otherwise penalized by his employer ... may bring an action ... for the reinstatement
of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of
employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if
such violation had not occurred. An employee's recovery from any
such action shall be limited to such items, provided the court may
allow to the prevailing party his costs, together with reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed by the court. Any employee found to have
knowingly made a false report shall be subject to disciplinary action
by his employer up to and including dismissal.
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15

employees.8 7 Accordingly, the at will doctrine survives today as
the basic law governing employment.
IV. THE

EMPLOYEE'S JOB SECURITY IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Professor Summers,88 and more recently, the New York City
Bar Association's Committee on Labor and Employment Law" °
have made surveys of the protection against dismissal afforded employees in several European countries. D0 Their research shows that
while each of the countries surveyed had at one point adhered to
the doctrine of employment at will, each has replaced that doctrine
with a statute prohibiting dismissal without just cause. 9 The
statutory standard for what constitutes an "unjust dismissal" in
several of these countries is rather vague, thus leaving room for
broad interpretation by the courts, and hence greater protection
for the employee. 92 The breadth of these statutes, together with
their inclusion of certain key provisions covering such areas as
adjudication of claims and employee remedies, provides a pointed
contrast to the lack of protection against unjust dismissal afforded
employees in the United States.93
Great Britain abandoned the common law rule of termination
at will in 1971 by adopting a comprehensive unfair dismissal law
which covered both blue and white collar workers as well as professionals and managers.m Portions of this act relating to unfair
87. See Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 15, at 1816 n.2 (citing
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF

THE UNITED STATES 427 (1979)).

88. See Summers, supra note 15, at 508-19.
89. See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 175-80.

90. Professor Summers discusses employee protection in France, Germany,
Great Britain, and Sweden, while the New York Bar Association in its Committee Report discusses employee protection in France, Germany, Great Britain,
Sweden, Italy, Japan, and Canada. See Summers, supra note 15, at 508-19;
Committee Report, supra note 15, at 175-80.
91. For a discussion of the statutes providing employee protection in
Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and Italy, see notes 92-122 infra.
For a discussion of similar statutes in Sweden, Japan, and Puerto Rico see
Summers, supra note 15, at 515-19 and Committee Report, supra note 15, at
177-79.
92. For a discussion of the vagueness of some of these statutes, see text
accompanying notes 96 & 112-13 infra.
93. This comparison does not take into account employees in the United
States belonging to unions and who are therefore afforded the protection of
the National Labor Relations Act. For a discussion of this Act, see notes 43-47
and accompanying text supra.

94. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, §§ 22-33.

For a general over-

view of this Act, see Summers, supra note 15, at 513-15.
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dismissals were subsequently consolidated in the Employment Protection Act of 1978. 95 This statute leaves the definition of unfairdismissal vague,"" but states that fair dismissal may be for reasons
"related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for
performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, or related to the conduct of the employee." 97 Alternatively, the employer has the burden of showing that the dismissal
was for "some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify
the dismissal of an employee holding the position which that
employee held." 98 Under this statute the employer has the burden
of proving that dismissal was fair. 99 The determination of the
fairness of the dismissal will depend on whether the employer
can show that under the circumstances he "acted reasonably in
treating [the employee's acts] as a sufficient reason for dismissingthe employee." '00 Finally, this Act provides for a variety of
remedies for unfair dismissal: fines,' 0 ' reinstatement, 102 and re03

engagement.1

Canada in 1978 adopted an unjust dismissal statute which provides protection only to nonmanagerial employees who have passed
a 12-month probationary period with their employer. 0 4 An em95. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 54-80.
96. See id. §§ 54, 57.
97. Id. § 57(I)(2)(a).
98. Id. § 57(I)(b).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 57(I)(3).
101. Id. § 68(2).
102. Id. § 69(I)(2)-(3). The Act defines reinstatement as follows:
(2) An order for reinstatement is an order that the employer shall
treat the complainant in all respects as if he had not been dismissed, and on making such an order the tribunal shall specify(a) any amount payable by the employer in respect of any
benefit which dismissal, including arrears of pay, for the
period between the date of termination of employment
and the date of reinstatement;
(b) any rights and privileges including seniority and pension
rights, which must be restored to the employee; and
(c) the date by which the order must be complied with.
Id. § 69(I) (2).
103. The Act defines re-engagement as follows:
(4) An order for re-engagement is an order that the complainant be
engaged by the employer, or by a successor of the employer or by
an associated employer, in employment comparable to that from
which he was dismissed or other suitable employment, and on
making such an order the tribunal shall specify the terms on
which re-engagement is to take place ....
Id. § 69(I)(4).
104. Labour Code, § 61.5, 1977-1978 Can. Stat. 615-16. See Howlett, DueProcess for Nonunionized Employees: A PracticalProposal,IRRA 32ND ANNUAL.
PROCEEDINGS 164, 166, cited in Committee Report, supra note 15, at 204 n.83..
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ployee bringing an action under this statute is heard by a government inspector who attempts a conciliation.'m If this fails, the
employee may refer his case to the Minister of Labor who appoints
an adjudicator whose decision is final. 10 6 An employee may be entitled not only to damages, but also to back pay and reinstatement
1 7
if his dismissal is found unjust.
France has been operating under an abus de droit statute since

1928.108 Under this statute an employee may not be dismissed for
any of the following reasons: illness or industrial injury, pregnancy,
political beliefs, exercising rights of citizenship, engaging in a strike,
or purely personal dislike by his employer. 10 9 An employee may be
awarded damages but not reinstatement."10 The employee's complaint is heard before a special tribunal after a conciliation has been
attempted, and under the Law of July 13, 1973, the employer must
show that there was a real and serious cause for the dismissal upon
a written request for such an explanation by the employee."'
In Germany, a statute enacted in 1951 provided that a dismissal must be voided if it were not "socially warranted." 112 The
German statute defined this term broadly:
"Socially unwarranted dismissal" means any dismissal not
based on reasons connected with the person or conduct of
the employee or on urgent service needs which preclude
his continued employment in the undertaking. The burden
of proving the facts on which the dismissal is based shall
lie upon the employer. 113
Decisions of labor courts in Germany suggest that dismissals
will be upheld for incompetence, negligence in work, repeated absenteeism, insubordination, disruption of order, or criminal activity
and that "[t]he conduct must be related to the job and must be
105. Labour Code, § 61.5(5), 1977-1978 Can. Stat. 616.
106. Id. § 61.5(6).

107. Committee Report, supra note 15, at 178.
108. Id. at 176; Summers, supra note 15, at 510.

109. See Summers, supra note 15, at 509-10.
110. Id. at 510.
111. See Loi no. 73-680 du 13 juillet 1973, Art. 24n., 1973 Dalloz-Sirey,
Legislation. For a discussion of this statute and recent trends in the law of
French employment contracts, see Sokol, Termination of French Labor Contracts, 14 INT'L LAW. 267 (1980).
112. Law of Aug. 10, 1951, An Act to Provide Protection Against Unwarranted Dismissals, [1951] Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I BGB1 499 translated in
1951 I.L.O. LEGISLATIVE SERIES 1951 Ger.D.R. 4., summarized in Summers,
supra note 15, at 511.
113. Id. § 1(2), quoted in Summers, supra note 15, at 511.
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such that dismissal is necessary to effective operations." 114 Since
the statute invalidates the dismissal, an employee who successfully
invokes the statute never loses his job and hence has a remedy
equivalent to reinstatement. In addition, the wronged employee is
entitled to back pay.11
Italy has also adopted several just cause statutes which, like
Canada's statute, cover employees subsequent to a probationary
period of employment.111 Just cause is again not defined in these
statutes 117 but has, through judicial interpretation, included dismissal for fraud, theft, disloyalty, chronic absenteeism, and serious
or dangerous insubordination." I8 An employee must first bring his
action to the labor office for conciliation and, if this fails, the parties
may agree to arbitrate the issue or the employee may pursue his
complaint in the courts. The burden of proving just cause rests
on the employer. A successful employee may be entitled to the
remedies of both reinstatement and damages. 119
In the early 1960's, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) adopted Recommendation 119 Concerning Termination of
Employment at the Initiative of the Employer.120 The recommended statute provides that termination should only occur for "a
valid reason" and delineates invalid reasons for dismissal which
include
(a) Union membership or participation in union activities
outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours;
(b) Seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the
capacity of a worker's representative;
114. See Summers, supra note 15, at 511.
115. Id. at 512-13.
116. Norme sulla tutela della libertA e dignit dei lavoratori, della digniti
sindacale e dell' attivitA sindacale nei luoghi di lavoro e norme sul collocamento, Law 300, May 20, 1970, Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti
della Repubblica Italiana (Rac. Uff.) 731-50 (1970); Norme sui licenziamenti
individuali, Law 15, July 15, 1966, Rac. Uff. 2538-42 (1966). For a discussion
of the combined effects of these statutes, see Committee Report, supra note 15,
at 177. Under the 1966 statute, the probationary period for statutory protection ends when the worker's employment becomes "definitive" or, in any
event, within six months after the commencement of employment. Norme sui
licenziamenti individuali, Law 15, July 15, 1966, art. 10, Rac. Uff. 2541 (1966).
117. See Norme sui licenziamenti individuali, Law 15, July 15, 1966, art. 1,
Rac. Uff. 2538 (1966). This statute incorporates the civil code's definition of
just cause. Id. Section 2119 of this code defines just cause in the negative:
it constitutes neither bankruptcy by the employer nor forced administrative
liquidation of his business. Codice civile, § 2119.
118. See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 177.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 179. The ILO proposal is presented in International Labor
Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 510 (1964).
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(c) The filing in good faith of a complaint or the par-

ticipation in a proceeding against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations; or
(d) Race, color, sex, marital status, religion, political
opinion, national extraction or social origin. 121

The ILO Recommendation does not suggest reinstatement as a
remedy in every instance but does suggest that a worker found to
be unjustly discharged should be entitled to monetary damages
22
unless he is reinstated with back pay.'

V. JUDICIAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE AT WILL DOCTRINE

A. A Cause of Action Under Contract Theories
Some judicial inroads have been made in the at will doctrine
predicated upon contract or implied contract principles. Cases cutting back on the doctrine have relied upon various arguments: the
dismissal was improper because the employee had detrimentally
relied on the employer's promise of work for a reasonable period
of time; 123 the employment was in fact not at will because of
implied-in-fact promises of employment for a specific duration
which meant that the employer could not terminate the employee
without just cause; 124 the employment contract contained express
or implied provisions that the employee would not be dismissed so
long as he satisfactorily performed his work; 125 the employer had
121. Id.
122. Id. at 180.
123. See, e.g., Lubrecht v. Laurel Stripping Co., 387 Pa. 393, 127 A.2d
687 (1956) (employee sacrificed other work to assume duties at defendant's
company); O'Neill v. ARA Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978)

(employee left his place of employ to work for defendant because of a promise
of future promotion); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App.
254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (employee left employer to work for competitor
in reliance upon assurance of complete job security).
124. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross 8: Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292

N.W.2d 880, 891 (1980) (evidence of assurances of job security in company
manual stating policy not to discharge without just cause sufficient to create a
question of fact for the jury). For further discussion of Toussaint, see notes
129-35 and accompanying text infra. See also Lanier v. Alenco, 459 F.2d 689
(5th Cir. 1972) (evidence sufficient to establish an oral contract of employment
for one year).
125. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.
2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (allegation that duration of
employment was for such period as work was satisfactory established foundation
for a cause of action); Bondi v Jewels by Edwar Ltd., 267 Cal. App. 2d 672,
73 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (allegation that employer made oral
agreement to employ the plaintiff for so long as plaintiff satisfactorily performed his duties raised question of fact as to whether the discharge was

proper); Cactus Feeders, Inc. v. Wittler, 509 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.
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assured the employee that he would not be dismissed except for
cause; 126 or that upon entering into the employment contract, the
employee gave consideration over and above the performance of
127
services to support a promise of job security.
Cases applying traditional implied contract theory frequently
involve reliance by an employee on personnel manuals which contain some assurance of job security, often in the form of a provision
stating that employees shall be discharged only for "cause." 128 The
Supreme Court of Michigan has recently extended this theory in
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield.129 Toussaint was employed
in a middle management position by the defendant and had inquired specifically about job security when he was hired. He testified that the defendant's representatives assured him orally that he
would not be fired so long as he did his job. He was at that time
given a manual of personnel policies which reinforced the oral
assurance of job security. 3 0° When Toussaint was fired, he brought
a cause of action against the defendant claiming that his discharge
violated his employment contract which, pursuant to language in
the company's personnel manual, permitted discharge only for
1974) (agreement that employee would be employed for so long as he satisfactorily performed his duties precluded employer from discharging employee
without showing good faith dissatisfaction).
126. See, e.g., Comfort & Fleming Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Hoxsey, 26 Wash.
App. 172, 613 P.2d 138 (1980) (breach of employee's contract term specifying
'termination for good cause shown" provided a defense to plaintiff employer's
action for breach of covenant not to compete); Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp.
211 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (employee reliance on promise that discharge would only
be for cause required employer to honor the commitment).
127. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (trier of fact could conclude that plaintiff employee's sacrifice of other
employment opportunities constituted additional consideration, thereby extending the contract for a reasonable period of time); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (an indefinite employment contract
is terminable only for just cause if the employee gives consideration in addition
to the contemplated services); Brawthen v. H &cR Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d
139, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (detriment, in the form of relocation of family and foregoing of other business, if bargained for, will constitute
sufficient consideration to support a contract for permanent employment).
128. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (employee based a successful cause of action on language in faculty
handbook by arguing that it created a contractual obligation); Hinkeldey v.
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971) (severance pay provision set
forth in employee manual constituted an enforceable contract). But see
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) (cause
of action relying on "good cause" provision in company manual for dismissal
unsuccessful); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975)
(even if employee handbook requirement of warning slips before dismissal were
part of employee contract, employer cannot be bound when employee is not
bound).
129. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
130. Id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
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cause. 18 ' The employer argued that Toussaint was merely an employee at will hired for an indefinite term and could therefore be
dismissed at will. The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected this
argument. 13 2 Essentially abrogating the at will doctrine in cases
where an employer has given some assurance of job security, the
court held that:
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that
an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is
legally enforceable although the contract is not for a
definite term-the term is "indefinite," and
2) such a provision may become a part of the contract
either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result
of an employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an
employer's policy statements. 33
The court further held that employee reliance on the existence
of such policy statements created a situation "instinct with an obligation" which could give rise to contractual rights in the employees.18 4 These rights may arise in the absence of evidence of
mutual agreement to that effect, even though neither party has
signed the statement of policy, and the employer, without notice,
is entitled to amend the statement of policy unilaterally. Furthermore, the court stated that these rights may exist even when the
statement of policy contains no reference to the specific employee,
his job description, or his compensation, the policy was not referred
to in preemployment interviews, and the employee did not learn of
its existence until after his hiring. 3 5
No court has yet applied the Toussaint principle to an at will
dismissal case. Recently, the New York Court of Appeals, however, in Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc.186 relied in part on assurances in a personnel handbook to sustain a cause of action for
131. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 880.
132. Id. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
133. Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
134. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 262 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917); McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 A.D. 62,
162 N.Y.S. 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)).
135. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. Critical to the court's holding was
its disposition of the question of mutuality of obligation. The court held that
the enforceability of a contract does not depend upon mutuality of obligation
but rather upon consideration. Mutuality of obligation, it held, is useful as a
rule of construction not of substantive law. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
136. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(N.Y. 1982).
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breach of contract by an employee who had been hired by a- publishing company for an indefinite period. The New York court
distinguished Weiner from Toussaint on the grounds that the
plaintiff in Weiner presented a valid contract action, yet one of
the sources of this contract was a personnel handbook containing
37
assurances that employees would be dismissed only for just cause.1
In explaining the varied elements of the employee's contract, the
court observed that
[f]irst, plaintiff was induced to leave Prentice Hall
with the assurances that McGraw-Hill would not discharge him without cause. Second, this assurance was
incorporated into the employment application. Third,
plaintiff rejected other offers of employment in reliance
on the assurance. Fourth, appellant alleged that, on
several occasions when he recommended that certain of
his subordinates be dismissed, he was instructed by his
supervisors to proceed in strict compliance with the handbook and policy manuals because employees could be discharged only for just cause. He also claims that he was
told that if he did not proceed in accordance with the
strict procedures set forth in the handbook, McGraw-Hill
would be liable for legal action. In our view, these factors
combine to present a question for trial: Was defendant
bound to a promise not to discharge plaintiff without just
and sufficient cause and an opportunity for rehabilitation? 138
Several recent state court cases have led the way in imposing
an additional limitation upon the applicability of Wood's rule "9
in the situation where the discharge is abusive. These cases have
recognized an implied contract cause of action under at will contracts of employment for discharge motivated by bad faith, malice
or retaliation. 14 0 This approach is predicated upon imposing an
137. Id. The Weiner court suggested that the contract should not be
invalidated on the sole ground of lack of mutuality of obligation, merely
because the employee was free to quit at will, if the employer received valid
consideration. Id. Earlier, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court, basing its argument on the absence of mutuality of obligation, had held
that an employer was not obligated to comply with the conditions of employment set forth in an employment manual. See Edwards v. Citibank, 74 A.D.2d
553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
138. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., -

N.Y.2d at

,

N.E.2d at -,

457

N.Y.S.2d at 197.
139. For a discussion of Wood's rule, see notes 23-29 and accompanying
text supra.
140. A similar cause of action has been based on tort theory and public
policy as well. For a discussion of this cause of action, see notes 158-73 and
accompanying text infra.
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implied duty on the part of the employer to terminate only in
good faith. The leading case in this area is Fortune v. National
Cash Register.1 4' The plaintiff alleged that his dismissal after
forty years of service was motivated by his employer's desire to
avoid paying him a commission on a five million dollar sale.
Fortune had been hired under a written contract which was
"terminable at will, without cause, by either party on written
notice." Despite the express language in the contract, the Su42
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that in this instance 1
the "written contract contains an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith constitute[d] a breach of contract." 143 The court based this implied
covenant on the basic principles of good faith and fair dealing
144
required of parties to contracts in commercial transactions.
In arriving at its decision, the court further relied on Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co.,1 45 a New Hampshire case, to support the

proposition that good faith is implied in contracts terminable at
will.' 40

The Monge decision is a more expansive adoption of the

theory of abusive discharge. Monge had alleged that her oral
contract of employment had been terminated because she had
refused to date her foreman. The jury found in her favor and
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the decision on
the issue of liability but remanded the case on the issue of
damages. 147 In examining the issue of discharge, the court considered the evolution of social and economic conditions. 148 The
court stated that "[i]n all employment contracts, whether at will or
for a definite term, the employer's interest in running his business
as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee
in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in main141. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
142. id. at 104, 364 N.W.2d at 1257. The court worded its decision such

that the holding in Fortune could not be taken as a broad affirmation of an
implied good faith requirement in every contract: "nor need we speculate as
to whether the good faith requirement is implicit in every contract for employment at will. It is clear, however, that, on the facts before us, a finding is
warranted that a breach of the contract occurred." Id.
143. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
144. Id.
145. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).

146. 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
147. 114 N.H. at 133-34, 316 A.2d at 552. The jury awarded Monge

damages for mental suffering. Because the supreme court characterized the
cause of action as one sounding in contract not tort, it held that the award
for mental suffering was not recoverable. Id.
148. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
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taining a proper balance between the two." 149 The court then
went on to hold that "a termination by the employer of a contract
of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice
or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 150
A recent decision applying the Monge rationale is Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.,151 involving an at will employee with
eighteen years of satisfactory service who was allegedly discharged
without cause. In Cleary, the California Court of Appeal held
that "[t]ermination of employment without legal cause after such
a period of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith
and fair dealing contained in all contracts." 152
A number of courts have thus circumvented the common law
at will doctrine under implied contract theories by finding that
contracts of employment contain an implied promise to deal in
good faith. Although a number of jurisdictions subscribe to an
implied good faith standard to protect an employee who has been
wrongfully discharged in an at will contract of employment, 15 3 a
comparable number of decisions can be found in other jurisdictions which deny recovery on such a basis. 15 4 Several commentators have expressed criticism of basing abusive discharge actions

on contract theories, 155 and have suggested that the issue is better
157
addressed by a tort theory'56 or by legislation.
149. Id.
150. Id.

151. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
152. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
153. See, e.g., Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (Ist
Cir. 1977); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass.
1980); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980).
154. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir.
1976); Lersen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. App.
1978); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
155. See, e.g., A Common Law Action, supra note 15, at 1454-56. One
author, however, has suggested that contract law is the better avenue to provide
protection to the at will employee. See Blackburn, Restricted Employer Dis-

charge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J.

467 (1980). For an analysis of implied contractual rights in employment at
will contracts, see Implied Rights, supra note 15.
156. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 15; A Common Law Action, supra note
15; ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 15.
157. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 15, at 519-32; Committee Report, supra
note 15, at 197.
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B. A Cause of Action Under Tort Theories
Professor Blades is credited with creating the cause of action
for "abusive discharge" under tort theory in his seminal piece on
employment at will: 158
The existing sources of protection for the employee
are patently inadequate. The question arises whether
any other kind of sanction might be used. An appropriate
legal response would be to Confer on the afflicted employee
a personal remedy for any damage he suffers when discharged as a result of resisting his employer's attempt to
intimidate or coerce him in a way which bears no reasonable relationship to the employment. For convenience,
a discharge so motivated might be termed an "abusive"
discharge. 159
In developing this cause of action, Blades draws upon the analogous action of abuse of process in which a remedy is provided
against the use of a legal right (access to the court system for
settlement of disputes) for an ulterior purpose regardless of
whether it can be otherwise justified. 16 0 Blades suggests that such
emphasis on state of mind makes this tort-based type of action
particularly appropriate as an approach to the problem of abusive
dismissals.' 61
As is the case for contractually based actions for wrongful
discharge 62 there are several distinct theories of liability within
the rubric of tortious abusive discharge. Specifically, causes of
action for abusive discharge have been based on intentional infliction of emotional harm, 1 3 tortious interference with employment relations, 64 and on a variety of theories of public policy. 165
158. See Blades, supra note 15.
159. Id. at 1413.
160. Id. at 1423.
161. Id.

162. For a discussion of causes of action sounding in contract, see notes
123-57 and accompanying text supra.
163. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315

(1976) (manager liable for intentional infliction of emotional harm for dismissing waitresses in alphabetical order in an attempt to pressure them into

disclosing who was responsible for stealing food); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r Inc.,
2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (complaint

which alleged plaintiff employee suffered emotional distress when employer
maligned his race while firing him stated a cause of action).
164. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979); Yaindl v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980).

The Yaindl

court refused to grant summary judgment to an employer charged with the
tort of intentional interference with the performance of a contract for its
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Courts have become more willing to increase employee job security
by imposing tort obligations on employers in connection with the
employment contract or relationship.
In recent years, the most prevalent theory applied in abusive
discharge cases is that the discharge violates statutory or other
established public policy. A number of states have recognized
this exception to the at will doctrine. 66 An early case applying
this theory defined public policy as "the principles under which
freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the
good of the community [or, alternatively] whatever contravenes
good morals or any established interests of society." 167 As the
cases illustrate, however, one court's interpretation of public
policy differs from that of another and these varying interpretations hinder the formulation of a clear and consistent statement
of the rule. 10
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently observed that
[t]he sources of public policy [which may limit the employer's right of discharge] include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics
may contain an expression of public policy ....
Absent
legislation, the judiciary must define the cause of action
in case-by-case determinations. 69
In general, the cases in which violations of public policy are
found fall into several categories of dismissal for 1) refusing to
agent's dismissal of an employee allegedly because the employee criticized
standards of product safety in the company. The Pennsylvania court suggested that several factors should be balanced in determining a wrongful discharge on this basis: the interest of the discharged employee "in making a
living, his employer's interest in running its business, its motive in discharging
[the employee] and its manner of effecting the discharge." Id. at 577, 422
A.2d at 620. See also Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d
141 (1976) (employee claimed that the officers and directors of his employer
wrongfully interfered with his employment contract).
165. See notes 167-229 and accompanying text infra.
166. See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 211 n.130. States recognizing the public policy exception include California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
167. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
168. For a discussion of these conflicting judicial views of public policy,
see notes 169-229 and accompanying text infra.
169. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505,
512 (1980).
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violate a statute; 170 2) exercising a statutory right; 171 3) performing
a statutory obligation; 172 and 4) reporting an alleged violation of
173
a statute of public interest.
1. Discharge for Refusal to Violate a Statute
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,174 decided in 1959, is one of the earliest tort cases based on the public
policy rationale. The employee alleged that the defendant employer had wrongfully discharged him in retaliation for the plaintiff's refusal to perjure himself in legislative hearings concerning
the employer's business. 175 Because state statutes proscribed the
commission of perjury or the suborning of perjury, 1 76 the California Supreme Court held that it was a violation of public policy
to allow an employer to dismiss an employee who refused to
perjure himself on his employer's behalf. 177 The court granted
the employee relief against his employer even though the perjury
laws themselves provided no express civil remedy to an employee. 178
In support of the public policy argument, the court stated that
"[t]he law must encourage and not discourage truthful testimony.
The public policy of this state requires that every impediment,
however remote to the above objective, must be struck down when
encountered." 17 Petermann represents a clear example of a situation in which limitations on the at will doctrine are appropriate:
an employee should not be forced to choose between the commission of a crime for his employer and the loss of his employ0
ment.18
170. For a discussion of refusal to violate a statute as a basis for the public
policy exception, see notes 174-83 and accompanying text infra.
171. For a discussion of the exercise of a statutory right as a basis of the
public policy exception, see notes 184-91 and accompanying text infra.
172. For a discussion of the performance of a statutory obligation as a
basis of the public policy exception, see notes 196-207 and accompanying text
infra.
173. For a discussion of the reporting of an alleged violation of a statute
as a basis for the public policy exception, see notes 208-28 and accompanying
text infra.
174. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
175. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 26.
176. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1970) (prohibiting the commission of perjury); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f (West 1970) (prohibiting solicitation of perjury).
177. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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The Petermann rationale was recently reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' a
case in which an employee was allegedly dismissed for refusing to
participate in a scheme to fix gasoline prices in violation of federal
and state antitrust laws. In extending protection to the employee,
the Tameny court summarized Petermann as stating:
[E]ven in the absence of an explicit statutory provision
prohibiting the discharge of a worker on such grounds,
fundamental principles of public policy and adherence to
the objectives underlying the state penal statutes require
the recognition of a rule barring an employer from discharging an employee who has simply complied with his
18 2
legal duty and has refused to commit an illegal act.
The California Supreme Court concluded that "an employer cannot
condition employment upon required participation in unlawful
conduct by the employee." 183

2. Discharge for Exercising a Statutory Right
The Petermann rationale has been extended beyond situations
where an employer has compelled the violation of a statute and
has been marshalled to protect an employee's exercise of a statutory
right such as filing for workers' compensation. In Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 84 the Supreme Court of Indiana recognized an exception to the at will doctrine where it was alleged
that the employee had been discharged in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim. Relying on language in the state
workers' compensation statute which stated that no contract, agreement "or other device" would operate to relieve an employer of
his obligations under the statute, 18 5 the court held that a discharge,
181. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).

See also

McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (alleged discharge
for refusal to participate in a price-fixing scheme was sufficiently related to
the state's public policy to sustain a cause of action for abusive discharge);
Trombetta v. Detroit, Tol. 8c I.R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385
(1978) (discharge for refusal to manipulate test results for pollution control in
violation of state statute would violate public policy).

But see Hinrichs v.

Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (discharge upheld based on
the at will doctrine in case where plaintiff refused to falsify medical records
as instructed).
182. 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1333-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (1980).
183. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1136, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
184. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
185. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-1 (Burns 1965).
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or threat of discharge, is such an unlawful device. 86 The Indiana
court observed that
[i]f employers are permitted to penalize employees for
filing workmen's compensation claims, a most important
public policy will be undermined. The fear of being
discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise
of a statutory right. Employees will not file claims for
justly deserved compensation-opting, instead, to continue
their employment without incident. The end result, of
course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his
obligation.8 7
In an analogous case, Sventko v. Kroger Co.,' 88 the plaintiff
alleged that her employment with the defendant had been terminated in retaliation for her filing of a workers' compensation claim.
The Michigan trial court, however, granted the employer summary
judgment on two grounds: 1) the legislature did not intend to
prohibit such retaliatory discharges since there was a provision in
the workers' compensation statute prohibiting "consistent discharges" of employees before they qualify under the Act, but no
similar provision prohibiting discharges in retaliation for the filing
of compensation claims; and 2) the public policy of the state did
not prohibit such discharges. 8 9 On appeal, the Michigan Court
of Appeals recognized the public policy exception to the at will
doctrine for retaliatory discharge in workers' compensation cases
and reversed the trial court, stating that "[a]n employer cannot
accept that benefit for himself [freedom from general liability for
negligence provided by the worker's compensation act] and yet
attempt to prevent the application of the act to the work-related
injuries of his employees without acting in direct contravention
of public policy. This Court cannot tolerate such conduct." 1)
Although a number of jurisdictions have granted relief to
employees who have been discharged in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim,' 9 ' many states have denied such relief
by strictly construing the workers' compensation statute. 9 2 For
186. 260 Ind. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
187. Id. at 251-52, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
188. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
189. Id. at 646-47, 245 N.W.2d at 152-53.
190. Id. at 648, 245 N.W.2d at 153-54.
191. See cases cited in Olsen, supra note 16, at 269 n.21; Committee
Report, supra note 15, at 212 n.137.
192. See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 212 n.137.
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example, in a recent North Carolina case, Dockery v. Lampart
Table Co., 198 the employee had relied on the Frampton interpretation of the statutory language "other device," which was also
found in the North Carolina statute. 94 The court, however,
rejected the Frampton interpretation of the language, stating that
if the legislature had intended to create a cause of action for
wrongful discharge based on retaliation for an employee's exercise
of statutory rights, it would have created a body of law as it had
with respect to union organizational rights. 195
3. Discharge for Performing a Statutory Obligation
The Petermann rationale has also been relied upon to create
a public policy exception to the at will doctrine in jury duty cases.
The leading case in this area is Nees v. Hochs, 96 a case in which
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages based on an alleged retaliatory discharge for her
service on a jury. Contrary to her employer's desires, the plaintiff
informed the clerk of the court that she would like to serve. When
this fact came to light, the employer dismissed her. 97 After reviewing the state's constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, the court
held that the state had a public policy in favor of encouraging jury
duty and that the will of the community would be thwarted if an
employer were allowed to discharge his employees for jury service.9 8
In reaching this result, the court concluded that "there can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such
a socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in
damages for any injury done." 199
In a similar cause of action for wrongful discharge based on
the acceptance of jury duty, Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,2 00
the Pennsylvania Superior Court had to look only as far as the
statutes and constitution to determine that the state had a public
policy in favor of such service. In light of both the state constitu193. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246
S.E.2d 215 (1978).

194. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 97-6 (1972).

195. 36 N.C. App. 299-300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
196. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
197. Id. at 513.
198. Id. at 516.
199. Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
200. 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
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tion's provision for a right to jury trial, 20 1 as well as the duty imposed on individuals by statute to obey a jury summons, 202 the
court held that public policy would be jeopardized if dismissals of
20 8
employees were allowed for accepting jury duty.
Some states, however, have refused to apply the public policy
exception to jury duty cases, preferring to uphold the at will
doctrine over any public policy arguments. 2°4 The Supreme Court
of Alabama, which had earlier rejected a public policy exception
in a wrongful dismissal case involving the filing of a workers' compensation claim, 205 likewise denied the exception in regard to a
20 6
dismissal for jury service in Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens.
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been dismissed for his
service on a grand jury and based his claim for wrongful discharge
on a state statute which protected employees from loss of their
wages while serving on a grand jury. Turning a deaf ear to the
public policy issues implicit in the statute and relying on a strict
interpretation of the at will doctrine, the court granted summary
2 07
judgment for the employer.

4. Discharge for Protectingthe Public Interest
The most controversial public policy exception to the at will
rule involves cases in which an employee acts in good faith to protect the public interest by disclosing information regarding his
employer's violation of a law, regulation or moral principle. These
cases are frequently referred to by the pejorative term "whistleblowing" and the employee is called the "whistleblower." 208 Instead, we will use the term "public disclosure" and "disclosing
employee." In recent years, some courts have allowed a cause of
201. Id. at 32, 386 A.2d at 120. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate ......
PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
202. 255 Pa. Super. at 32, 386 A.2d at 120-21. One of the Pennsylvania
statutes relied upon stated that disobedience to a summons for jury trial shall
be treated the same as disobedience to any other summons of the court. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1336 (Purdon Supp. 1977). Another statute cited provided for a fine to be imposed on a person who fails to appear when summoned for jury duty. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1009 (Purdon 1962).
203. 255 Pa. Super. at 34-35, 386 A.2d at 121.
204. See Olsen, supra note 16, at 274 n.43.
205. See Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978).
206. 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980).
207. Id. at 595.
208. For a discussion of "whistleblowing" generally and in the context of
the discharge of employees, see Committee Report, supra note 15, at 185-87,
213 n.151. For a discussion of statutory protection of disclosing employees,
see notes 77-86 and accompanying text supra.
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action against an employer who has discharged an employee for
reporting or disclosing business activities of the employer which
the employee considered unlawful or unethical. For example, employees have successfully maintained causes of action based on discharge due to disclosure of their employer's violations of state and
210
federal consumer protection 209 and antitrust laws.
Generally, courts have been reluctant to extend the public
policy exception to include the employee who discloses information
regarding his employer's statutory violation unless the violation is
certain. In one of the earliest of the public disclosure cases, Geary
v. United States Steel Corp.,21n the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied the employee's cause of action. The plaintiff in Geary was
an-employee who had been with United States Steel Corporation for
fourteen years and who had responsibility for sales of tubular
products to the oil and gas industry. Geary became concerned that
a particular product had not been adequately tested and constituted
a danger to those who used it. He voiced his thoughts to his immediate superiors who ordered him "to follow directions." Nonetheless, Geary continued to express his concerns and, as a result of
his efforts, the product was reevaluated and withdrawn from the
market. Geary, however, was dismissed. He asserted that the dismissal was wrongful, malicious, and abusive and sought both punitive and compensatory damages for injury to his reputation, mental
anguish, and direct financial harm.2 12 In denying Geary's cause of
action, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the interest which
deserved the greatest protection was that of the employer in preserving the company's "normal operational procedures" from disruption:
The praiseworthiness of Geary's motives does not detract
from the company's legitimate interest in preserving its
normal operational procedures from disruption. In sum,
while we agree that employees should be encouraged to
express their educated views on the quality of their employer's products, we are not persuaded that creating a
new non-statutory cause of action of the sort proposed by
2 13
appellant is the best way to achieve this result.

209. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978).
For a discussion of Harless, see text at notes 224-26 infra.
210. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).

For a general discussion of Tameny, see text

accompanying notes 181-83 supra.
211. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
212. Id. at 173-74, 319 A.2d at 175.
213. Id. at 183, 319 A.2d at 180.
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The court preemptorily dismissed Geary's argument that he
was acting in the best interests of the public and his employer,
stating that Geary was qualified only to sell the product and not to
make an expert judgment in matters of product safety.21 4 In its
closing remarks, the court left open the possibility for a different
holding where a "clear mandate of public policy" had been violated. 215 The court stated that
it may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life
in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by virtue of the employer's
power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of
action, particularly where some recognized facet of public
216
policy is threatened.
The court, however, did not feel that Geary's suit represented such
a case.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Roberts stated that the
public policy of the state had been deeply offended by Geary's
discharge. 217 In elaborating, he emphasized the importance to the
public of product safety and that "the prevention of injury is a
fundamental and highly desirable objective of our society." 218 To
further this objective, Justice Roberts suggested resort to the tort
of wrongful discharge:
If the existence of the tort of wrongful discharge in these
circumstances (assuming, as we must, the truth of all facts
alleged) will keep employees like George Geary on corporate payrolls, both the employer's and the public's interest will have been served. Affording relief for arbitrary
and retaliatory discharge in no way impinges upon the
employer's right to discharge for cause. That difficult
linedrawing may be involved is of no great moment, since
courts are daily confronted with the task of separating
219
wheat from chaff.
In Percival v. General Motors Corp.,22 0 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri followed the
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
1976).

Id. at 181, 319 A.2d at 178-79.
Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
Id. at 187, 319 A.2d at 181 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 189, 319 A.2d at 182 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir.
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same line of reasoning applied in Geary. In Percival, the plaintiff,
an executive engineer for General Motors for twenty-six years,
alleged that he had been dismissed because he had attempted to
correct false impressions given by the corporation to outside business associates and he had urged corporate management itself to
correct misleading information conveyed to the public. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment,
holding that even if the employee's allegations were correct and
could be proven, his dismissal did not constitute a serious enough
breach of public policy to state a cause of action for wrongful or
retaliatory discharge.2 21 The district court expressed the same
concerns about the employment relation that had been presented
in Geary: "[t]he courts which have recognized this non-statutory
cause of action have done so cautiously, recognizing that a proper
balance must be maintained between the employee's interest in
earning his livelihood and the employer's interest in operating
his business efficiently and profitably." 222 The decision was upheld
on appeal with the Eighth Circuit emphasizing the importance of
respecting the employer's right to exercise unfettered judgment
as to who should remain in his employ:
It may be conceded to plaintiff that there are strong
policy arguments that can be made in support of the
theory which he invokes; there are also strong policy arguments that can be made against it. It should be kept in
mind that as far as an employment relationship is concerned, an employer as well as an employee has rights;
and it should also be kept in mind that a large corporate
employer such as General Motors, except to the extent
limited by statute or contractual obligations, must be accorded wide latitude in determining whom it will employ
and retain in employment in high and sensitive managerial
positions.223
Even when the employee's disclosure is in the interest of the
public, courts have been reluctant to apply the public policy exception to factual situations in which the dismissal does not involve
a violation of a specific statute or of a legislatively sanctioned
public policy. The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
221. 400 F. Supp. at 1324.
222. Id. at 1323 (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974)).
223. 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976).
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West Virginia in Harless v. First National Bank 224 suggests the

type.of disclosure which will sustain a cause of action for wrongful
discharge by an employer. In Harless, the plaintiff alleged that
he had been wrongfully discharged for attempting to convince
his employer to comply with the state consumer credit laws and
for disclosing certain incriminating files to the bank's auditors.
In sustaining the plaintiff's action, the court reasoned that the
"manifest public policy" embodied in the state law protecting
consumers would be frustrated if an employee who attempted to
ensure compliance with this law could be discharged without legal
recourse. 225 The court also stated that the at will doctrine should
be tempered further by the principle that "where the employer's
motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial public
policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee
for damages occasioned by the discharge." 226
Another example of retaliation for public disclosure which
supports an action for wrongful discharge is Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. 227

An employee of sixteen years alleged

that he was dismissed for supplying information to local law
enforcement officials concerning alleged illegal activities of a
co-employee. The plaintiff alleged that his dismissal was based
also on his willingness to assist in the investigation and to give
testimony at trial. The court held that the plaintiff had been
discharged in violation of an established public policy, and
explained that
[t]here is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . .
enforcement of a State's criminal code. . . .

.

. than the
No specific

constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to
take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution
of crime, but public policy nevertheless favors citizen
crimefighters.

22 11

Language in such cases as Geary, Percival, Harless, and
Palmateer seems to suggest that a plaintiff's success in a case of
wrongful discharge will depend upon the value a particular court
places on the public policy alleged to be violated. Unless legis224. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978).
225. Id. at 276.

226. Id. at 275 (footnote omitted).
227. 85 11l. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
228. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879-80 (citations omitted).
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lation setting down clear guidelines is enactedy -' employees discharged for disclosing information will be left to the whims of
the judiciary.
VI. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH

The United States has witnessed significant changes in socioeconomic values which necessitate a reassessment of the at will
rule. Formerly, employers were predominantly individuals who
operated their own shops and were familiar with all their employees. Today, a great number of employers are large, multiemployer corporations 230 which wield a tremendous amount of
power over employees.
This section will examine the classical economic justifications
for the at will rule, and the extent to which the assumptions upon
which the rule is based have been eroded by changed circumstances. After establishing that these justifications for allowing
the employer unbridled power "to run his business as he sees fit"
are'no longer valid,231 we will examine the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment by identifying the costs of
the employment at will rule. 2 2 Finally, we will propose a statutory solution that restores and maintains a proper balance among
the legitimate interests of the employer, employee and society at
large.
A. Classical Justifications
Historically, both the at will termination rule and the overall
free market system have been justified on two grounds: freedom
and efficiency.2 33 Freedom in this context means the ability to
229. A few states have in fact already enacted legislation which would

remedy such situations. See notes 77-86 and accompanying text supra.
230. J. BEHRMAN, DISCOURSES ON ETHICS AND BUSINESS 44-45 (1981).
231. For this evaluation of the classical justifications for the at will rule,
see notes 233-62 and accompanying text infra.
232. For a discussion of the costs of the at will rule, see notes 263-69 and
accompanying text infra.
233. The presumption underlying the at will doctrine-namely that if the
parties to a contract intended their agreement to endure for a definite period
of time, they would have incorporated express terms manifesting such an
intent in the contract-conformed to "a premise of complete social freedom;
only if an individual clearly intended to obligate himself would the law enforce
any restriction on his basic freedom." Protecting At Will Employees, supra
note 15, at 1825-26. In addition, by lifting the limitations on the employer's
freedom in the employment relationship, the at will rule was intended to
further economic growth and entrepreneurship. See Feinman, The Development of the At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). In this manner,
the at will rule enhanced the efficiency of the laissez-faire, capitalistic economic
system.
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choose, while efficiency refers to the careful allocation of resources
at both the individual employer's level as well as throughout the
entire economic system. 234 Changes in the system, however, have
2 35
rendered inapplicable these justifications for the at will rule.
The existence of a capitalistic system and the interplay of its
necessary components were predicated upon three conditions:
1) full employment accomplished through flexible wages and
prices; 236 2) the notion that labor, as one of the factors of production, was a commodity to be bought and sold; 287 and 3) the
238
equitable distribution of income according to contribution.
Under the capitalistic model, the prices of goods and labor would
fluctuate so that all labor would be employed and employees
would accept their wages as an appropriate reward for their
service. Unemployment would always remedy itself: wages would
fall and employers would find it in their best interest to hire
additional employees. 23 9 Labor would also efficiently flow to the
more desirable jobs, thereby penalizing bad employers and reFor a discussion of the Supreme Court's deference to this laissez-faire
system in the context of the employment contract, see text accompanying
notes 30-34 supra.
234. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 230, at 19-33. The capitalistic system requires the presence and working of six components: economic motivation,
private productive property, free enterprise, free market, competition, and
limited government. Id. We will examine the changes affecting the presence
and operation of free enterprise, free market, competition, and limited government.
235. For a critique of these classical justifications, see notes 242-62 and
accompanying text infra. A separate historical justification has been predicated upon the strict contract principles of consideration and mutuality of
obligation. For a discussion of these principles, see notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra. Changed circumstances, however, have resulted in the
abandonment of a number of strict contract principles. See, e.g., The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976) (prohibiting disclaimer
of implied warranties); The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976) (granting right of revocation at option of purchaser
for seven days).
Even more apposite is the Uniform Commercial Code which recognizes
that within the context of a contractual relationship, both parties are under
an obligation of good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1972). By analogy, the
obligation of good faith should also be imposed upon the employment rela.
tionship. See Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1256 (1977) (written contract of employment "contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in
good faith constitutes a breach of the contract.").
236. See J. BERMAN, supra note 230, at 30-31.
237. Id. at 31-32.
238. Id. at 32-33.
239. Id. at 30.

See also C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROB-

LEMS, AND POLICIES 221-24 (6th ed. 1975).
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Consequently, a free labor market

that is efficient and effective would insure that the individual
desire for economic reward would also promote societal wealth
24 1
and the public good.

B. Failure of the Classical Justifications
1. Freedom

In order for a worker to have freedom of choice, the underlying assumptions of full employment, labor as a commodity, and
equitable distribution of income all must be met. However, none
of them has proved to be valid and, consequently, the justification
of the at will rule on the basis of freedom is illusory.
Full employment has never existed in the United States and
it is highly unlikely that it will exist at any time in the foreseeable
future. 242 It is therefore meaningless to maintain that an employee
240. Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INTEREST,
Fall 1979, at 69.
241. See A. SMITh, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
242. Full employment has been defined as the level at which all those
who are able, willing, and seeking work at prevailing wage rates are employed. H. SHAPIRO, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 342 (2d ed. 1970). Other
economists define full employment as "the condition . . . when all available
capital, labor, and management are being used to capacity," or, in a looser
sense, as "the complete utilization of labor resources." J. CRONIN, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND PROBLEMS 345 (1949).
While economists concede that while full employment is a desirable social
goal, it is not possible due to the inevitable existence of unemployment in a
free enterprise economy.

N.F. KEISER, ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS AND POLICY 14-16

(1965). There are four types of unemployment necessarily extant if the labor
market is to function properly: I) between-job or "frictional" unemployment;
2) technological or "structural" employment when jobs simply cease to exist;
3) seasonal unemployment; and 4) initial unemployment experienced by those
entering the job market for the first time. M.A. COPELAND, TOWARD FULL
EMPLOYMENT

IN OUR FREE ENTERPRISE

ECONOMY 2-4

(1966).

Consequently,

even the concept of full employment must contemplate a rate of unemployment in the labor force of at least three to five percent. Gordon, Full Employment As a Policy Goal, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND THE LABOR MARKET 45-46
(A.M. Ross ed. 1965).
Unemployment has been a consistent part of American history. The highest unemployment rate between 1950 and 1970 was 6.8% of the civilian labor
force in 1958. That figure marked an incredible reduction of unemployment
since the depression when, for example, in 1933 approximately 25% of the
civilian labor force was unemployed. M.A. COPELAND, supra, at vi, 1. In the
past ten years, the number of unemployed has fluctuated between 6% and
10% of the civilian labor force. For example, in the first half of 1981, 7.4%
of the civilian labor force was unemployed. In 1980, the unemployment rate
was 7% of the civilian labor force. The highest number of unemployed
between 1970 and 1981 occurred in 1975 when 7.8 million people out of a
civilian labor force totalling 93.1 million were unemployed. This represented
8.4% of the civilian labor force. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL DATA BOOK

AND GUIDE TO STATISTICS 379 (102 ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
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who has no alternative employment available has the freedom to
leave his job. The greater the level of unemployment, the more
restricted is the choice of employment. With little choice, there is
little freedom and in the present period of economic recession the
worker is particularly lacking in choice.
Furthermore, as one commentator has observed, employees
have rejected the notion that their work is a mere commodity and
"that there is no relationship between man and his work other
than the significance of the wage." 243 Rather, many employees
244
today believe that their labor is an integral part of their lives.
Likewise, workers do not presently believe that they are equitably
treated by the market place, especially in times of great unemployment.246 As one commentator has observed, employees feel they
ABstRACT]. More recent unemployment figures have been increasingly dire.
For instance, in September 1981, 10.1% of the civilian labor force over the age
of 16 was unemployed. Arenson, On the Frontier of a New Economics, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1982, at Fl, col. 3.
243. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 230, at 31.
244. Id. at 41. Some classical economists have maintained that labor is
simply another commodity to be sold in its respective market subject to the
laws of supply and demand.
N.F. KEISER, supra note 242, at 523. Others, on
the other hand, have maintained that the human personalities which make up
the labor force cannot be perceived of as impersonal commodities. G. WATKINS,
P. DODD, W.

McNAUGHTON,

P. PRAsow, THE

MANAGEMENT

OF PERSONNEL

AND

85-86 (1950) [hereinafter cited as WATKINS & DODD]. For
further discussion of the Watkins and Dodd approach, see note 245 infra.
While an employee's attitude towards his work is, of course, highly subjective, the Department of Commerce has attempted to quantify these attitudes
in statistics. It recently reported a study on commitment to work by the
National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago that was
conducted in 1973-74 and 1976-77. The sample size of the 1973-74 study was
1,558 with 820 responding, while the sample size of the 1976-77 study was
1,514 with 842 responding. The participants in this study were asked whether
they would continue to work if they had enough money to live on comfortably
for the rest of their lives. In the 1973-74 study, 67% responded that they
would continue working, while 33% would stop working. In the 1976-77
study, 69.6% would continue working, while 30.4% would stop working.
LABOR RELATIONS

BUREAU

OF

THE

CENSUS,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

COMMERCE,

SOCIAL

INDICATORS

III,

Commitment to Work 348, table 7/1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
CATORS III] (citing NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF
CAGO, NATIONAL DATA PROGRAM OF THE SOCIAL
SURVEYS, 1972-78: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK (1978)).

SCIENCES,

GENERAL

INDICHISOCIAL

245. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 230, at 32-33. The Department of Commerce reported that a dramatic decline in job satisfaction occurred between
1973-77 despite the continuing strong commitment to work. See SOCIAL INDICATORS III, supra note 244, at 306. See also WATKINS & DODD, supra note 244.
These commentators have stressed that labor cannot be viewed as a commodity:
Labor resembles a commodity in that, like other objects of exchange, it commands a price on the market. The quality of exchangeability, however, does not reduce human beings to the level of impersonal things. The energy and skill which are sold by the laborer
are inseparable from his life and personality; these are essentially a
part of himself . . . . [The laborer's] own immediate welfare, the
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are entitled to a "living wage" and a higher quality of work life. 246
Labor, therefore, is part of an economic system which, because
of faulty assumptions, provides little mobility or freedom of choice.
The lack of freedom is a result of, and exacerbated by unemployment, inequitable distribution of wealth 247 and an unacceptable,
dehumanized view of labor as a factor of production. Consequently,
it is specious to justify the at will employment rule on the basis of
freedom of the worker.
2. Efficiency
The second justification for the at will rule-the efficient allocation of resources-is also without merit. This conclusion may be
demonstrated through an examination of efficiency at both the
macro (system-wide) and micro (company-wide) level.
The contention that the at will rule promotes efficiency at the
macro level 248 is unsupportable because of the basic distortions in
the market system as it operates today. The only component of
the capitalistic system that remains valid or unchanged is economic
motivation; the other components have been significantly altered. 249
Most significantly, individuals involved with production, those
whose interests are represented by land, labor, and capital, have
sought protection from the system through the government. Government intervention in response to this pressure has led to a mixed
welfare of his family, his future and consequently the future of those
who depend upon his economic efforts, his health, and his very lifeall are invariably involved in [the laborer's work product].
Id. at 85-86.
Furthermore, these commentators argue, laborers do not have the high
degree of mobility which commodities enjoy, because workers are constrained
by financial and familial considerations. A laborer is also characterized by
extreme perishability; he cannot afford to wait for a better opportunity to sell
his skill. Labor is further distinguished from commodities because once the
labor force is diminished, it takes years to revitalize. Finally, laborers, unlike
commodities, are not passive objects, but conscious human personalities. Id.
246. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 230, at 41. See also D. MCGRECOR, THE
HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE 33-49 (1960). The failure of these two assumptions
is evidenced by the protection from the market place which the labor force
has sought. For a discussion of labor's effort to gain protection from the
market place, see notes 253-55 and accompanying text infra.
247. For example, in 1970, 27.4% of American households earned incomes
under $5,000, while .9% earned $50,000 and over. In 1979, 13.2% earned less
than $5,000, while 4.1% earned over $50,000. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 242, at 434.
248. The argument has been made that because the at will rule affords
the employer complete freedom in the employment relationship, it enhances
the efficiency of the laissez-faire economy. See Feinman, supra note 233.
249. J. BHRImtaN, supra note 230, at 35-53. For an enumeration of these
six components, see note 234 supra.
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economy with government playing a major role. Given the magnitude of its role, it is now untenable to maintain that the at will
rule is necessary to promote efficient allocation of resources at the
macro level.
Protectionism has taken a number of forms and has been sought
by groups involved in all aspects of production. Industrialists and
farmers sought "fair and reasonable" competition to assuage the
effects of the market's "perfect" competition based upon the model
of atomistic units of production.250 For instance, industry pressed
for tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and even direct governmental support.m1 Although tariffs were originally imposed to protect infant
American industries, tariffs remain in force to protect a number of
"mature" industries. Agricultural groups also obtained protection
from the hardships of the market place through parities, subsidies,
and quotas 52 As a result, efficient and system-wide allocation of
resources became secondary to the protection of personal interests.
3
The labor force also sought protection from the market.ms
This pressure resulted finally in protective legislation. For example,
in 1932 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia

Act, 254 which

severely restricted the power of the judiciary to impose injunctions
in labor disputes and declared that as a matter of public policy
employees should be permitted to organize and bargain collectively.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the National Labor Relations
250. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 230, at 37, 40.
251. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 230, at 37-40; Steiber & Block, Summary and
Conclusions, U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1950-1980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 343
(1981).
252. Congress first gave recognition to the parity concept in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. See SEN. Doc. No. 129, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1953).
253. See generally J. GETMAN, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE AND
(1978); R. GORMAN, BASIC
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1976).
POLICY

TEXT

ON

LABOR

LAW:

UNIONIZATION

AND

During the early decades of the nineteenth century concerted activities by
labor to obtain higher wages and better working conditions were met by
criminal prosecution. J. GETMAN, supra, at 2. In 1842, however, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the notion that union activity constituted a conspiracy subject to criminal prosecution. Commonwealth v. Hunt,
45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842). Nevertheless, the courts and employers continued to frustrate the labor movement by means of the injunction. J. GETMAN,
supra, at 3-8; R. GORMAN, supra, at 1-3. This new and more successful anti-labor
weapon was further bolstered in 1890 with the enactment of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976)). Therefore, confronted with anti-labor decisions, low wages,
poor working conditions, and the unavailability of options, it is not surprising
that labor turned to the political process and the government for relief.
254. Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1976)).
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Act 25 5 and created the National Labor Relations Board, which
further promoted the activity of organized labor.
Consequently, in view of the intervention of the government
to protect the varied interests of industrialists, farmers, and the
labor force, it is no longer possible on the macro level to cite
efficiency as a justification for the at will rule.
On the micro level, it has been contended by business and
accepted by a number of courts that the employment at will rule
is essential to the efficient operation of business. 25 6 Without the
power to dismiss an employee, with or without cause, the employer,
it is asserted, would lose control over his business. 25 7 Although
there is no study demonstrating conclusively whether termination
of the at will rule would promote efficiency at the micro level, recent
studies comparing unionized with nonunionized facilities indicate
that there is no significant, if any, difference in managerial efficiency.258 To be sure, these analyses are confounded by the large
number of variables beyond the right to terminate an employee
at will.
In fact, elimination of the at will rule can promote efficiency.
First, it would increase the loyalty of one's employees. By providing an employee with some degree of job security, an employer
would promote the employee-employer relationship, reduce attrition, improve morale, encourage cooperation, and ultimately create
259
a positive effect on productivity.
255. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (1980)). In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress set forth
certain "findings and declaration of policy" which suggest the relationship
between the termination at will employment contract and the need for protective legislation:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between the industries.
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (emphasis added)).
256. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, afl'd,
539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,
319 A.2d 174 (1974).
257. Feinman, supra note 233; Note, Employment At Will Rule, 31 ALA.
L. REv. 421 (1980).

258. Steiber & Block, supra note 251; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 240.
259. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 240, at 70-82.
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Comparisons with the experience of other countries lends further support to the proposition that the right to terminate employees at will does not necessarily increase efficiency. Statistics
clearly show that "American productivity levels are very poor by
international standards." 260 In 1979, the increase in productivity
of all Japanese industries (which are typified by a lifetime employment commitment) was ten percent, while the corresponding in21
crease in American productivity was less than two percent.
Moreover, from 1973-1979 the annual percentage increase in manufacturing productivity for the United States was 1.4 percent compared with Japan's 6.9 percent, Belgium's 6.0 percent, Germany's
5.3 percent, Netherland's 5.3 percent, France's 4.8 percent, Denmark's 4.4 percent, Italy's 3.7 percent, Sweden's 2.4 percent,
Canada's 2.2 percent and United Kingdom's 0.5 percent. 262 Thus,
with the exception of the United Kingdom, several countries that
have eliminated the at will rule, have experienced productivity
superior to that of the United States.
C. Cost of the At Will Rule
Having demonstrated the invalidity of efficiency and employee
freedom as justifications for the at will rule, we will now examine
the legitimate interest of the employee in maintaining his employment by exploring the costs that the rule imposes upon the employee and society. The economic costs to both the discharged
employee and the economy are by no means trivial. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1978 merely 23.6 percent of
nonagricultural, private employees were members of unions and
260. Thomson, A View From Abroad, U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 19501980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 297 (1981). See also Hayes & Abernathy, Man-

aging Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67;
Neef & Capdevielle, International Comparisons of Productivity and Labor
Costs, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1980, at 32; Revitalizing the U.S. Economy,
Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 56.
261. Williamson, Japanese Methods for Improving Productivity Levels of
American Corporations (1981) (unpublished working paper).
Since the 1880's, the rate of increase of productivity in Japan has been
among the highest in the world. E. HAGEN, THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT
295 (1975). The Japanese industrial corporation is a unique creature of the
Japanese culture. Because of that country's cultural traits and the personality
traits of its citizens, there is a lifetime employment commitment between an
individual and his company. A company will generally hire workers as they
leave school and retain them until retirement except in instances of most
extreme provocation. Id. at 295-98.

262. Neef &Capdevielle, supra note 260, at 32-33.
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only 19.7 percent of the total labor force belonged to a union.20 3
Professor Cornelius Peck has estimated that:
[Alt least 12,000 to 15,000 employees are discharged or
disciplined each year under circumstances that would have
led to arbitration if they had been working under a collective bargaining agreement and represented by a union.
At least half of the discharges would have been found to
be unjustifiable. There are no reliable statistics concerning the number of discharges that are withdrawn as a
result of negotiations in the grievance procedures established by collective bargaining agreements, but if negotiation of discharge and discipline grievances produces settlements at a rate comparable to that experienced in other
dispute settlement negotiations, the number of discharge
and discipline cases in the nonunionized sector that would
have been subjected to that process in a collective bargaining relationship could be as high as 300,000 a year. 264
Professor Peck further points out the added difficulty a terminated employee will have finding new employment as prospective
employers will usually inquire about their previous employment.2 6 5
Prospective employers tend to view with skepticism statements by
an applicant that his previous employer had terminated him
without explanation, or without cause or in bad faith.
In addition to the economic costs, there are also severe psychological costs. The psychological impact of discharge upon the
employee, the employee's spouse and family is now well documented. 26

Unemployment and discharge have long been con-

nected with suicide 267 and mental disorder.268 More specifically,
studies have linked unemployment and discharge to an increased
sense of loneliness and abandonment, a sense of morbidity and
personal fraility, an increase of distrust for employers, an increase
263.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR

STATISTICS

412, table 165 (1980).

In contrast, unionization among nonagrithe mid-1940s and the

cultural workers ranged from 31-35 percent between

mid-1950s. Id.
264. Peck, supra note 15, at 10.
265. Id. at 5.
266. MENTAL HEALTH AND THE ECONOMY (L. Ferman & J. Gordus eds.
1979); Dooley & Catalano, Economic Change as a Cause of Behavioral Disorder,
87 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 450 (1980).
267. MENTAL HEALTH AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 266; Pierce, The
Economic Cycle and the Social Suicide Rate, 32 AM. Soc. REV. 457 (1967).
268. Id.
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in gambling, an increase in spouse and child abuse, and an increase
269
in divorce rate.
D. Statutory Proposal
In view of the failure of traditional justifications for the
employment at will principle as well as the tremendous hardship
it imposes on employees, this rule must be abandoned. While
courts have taken steps in this direction 270 the decisional law in
this area suffers from a lack of uniformity. 271 Accordingly, we
propose legislative rather than judicial reform. 272 More particularly, we propose that a Uniform Model Act be enacted and
adopted by the individual states to supplement existing remedies.
The Model Act would perform two major functions: 1) providing
the employee with adequate protection while preserving the employer's legitimate interest in efficiently and effectively operating
his business; and 2) avoiding unnecessary expense and discord
within the system. This latter goal fundamentally distinguishes
273
this proposal from other suggested approaches.
The Model Act would provide protection for all employees,
except those covered by collective bargaining agreements or individual contracts of employment. The Act should limit an employer's right to terminate an employee, after the employee has
274
to "just
been employed for a six month probationary period,

269. The Devastating Impact of Plant Relocations, WORKING

PAPERS FOR

July-Aug. 1978, at 42-53; Shostak, The Human Cost of Plant
Closings, AFL-CIO AM. FEDERATIONIST, Aug. 1980, at 22. See also studies

A NEW SOcIETY,

cited in notes 266-67 supra.

270. For a discussion of the judicial modifications of the at will doctrine,
see notes 123-229 and accompanying text supra.
271. See id.
272. For a discussion of other proposals for legislative reform, see Blades,
supra note 15, at 1433; Summers, supra note 15, at 519; Committee Report,
supra note 15, at 197. For a discussion of proposals for judicial reform, see
Peck, supra note 15, at 3; Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 15, at
1817; Implied Rights, supra note 15, at 369. The legislation which we propose
here would protect only those employees not already protected from unjust
dismissal by the National Labor Relations Act. For a discussion of this Act,
see notes 43-46 & 255 and accompanying text supra.
273. For a list of other commentaries proposing legislative reform, see
note 272 and accompanying text supra. Professor Summers, for example, proposes that disputes regarding employment between employer and employee
should be resolved through arbitration and that the cost of such arbitration
be shared by the state, the employee, and the employer. See Summers, supra
note 15, at 522, 524.
274. The Canadian and Italian unjust dismissal statutes have similar provisions for a probationary period. See notes 104 & 116 and accompanying
text supra.
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cause." 275 An individual who is unjustly dismissed should be
able to collect damages or demand reinstatement, whichever he
prefers.2 7 6 Moreover, the burden of proof should be on the employer to demonstrate just cause in dismissing the employee. 277
It is our recommendation that just cause be defined as not including: 1) the exercise of a statutory right or fulfillment of a statutory
obligation; 2) the refusal to violate a statute; and 3) under certain
circumstances, the reporting of a violation or suspected violation
committed by an employer.
Application of the first proposed legislative exclusion from
discharge for "just cause" would avoid the inequitable results
reached in Dockery v. Lampart Table Co. 278 and Bender Ship

Repair, Inc. v. Stevens.279 In upholding an employer's right to
terminate an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim
and for serving on a grand jury, respectively, these cases contravene
sound public policy. An individual should not be punished for
exercising his legitimate rights or performing his duty to society.
The second legislative exclusion would eliminate the situation
where the employee is forced to choose between violating the law
and retaining his employment. 28 0 The proposal adopts the position taken in Petermann28 ' and Tameny 2s2 that "[t]he employer
cannot condition employment upon required participation in
unlawful conduct by the employee." 283
The third legislative exclusion from termination for just cause,
the reporting of a violation or suspected violation, presents a more
difficult issue. Nevertheless, without this protection, public spirited
275. We propose that just cause be defined in a manner which more fully
balances the interests of the employer, employee, and society than the common
and private law that has developed pursuant to the National Labor Relations
Act. For a discussion of the law that has developed under the National Labor
Relations Act, see Summers, supra note 15, at 499-508.
276. Great Britain's Employment Protection Act of 1978 provides similar
remedies. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
277. Great Britain's Employment Protection Act of 1978 likewise places
this burden on the employer. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
278. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246
S.E.2d 215 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see notes 193-95 and accompanying text supra.
279. 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980). For a discussion of this case, see note
206 and accompanying text supra.
280. For a discussion of cases involving discharge for refusal to violate a
statute, see notes 174-83 and accompanying text supra.
281. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). For a
discussion of Petermann, see notes 174-80 and accompanying text supra.
282. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 181-83 and accompanying text supra.
283. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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individuals who seek to protect the welfare of society must bear the
entire cost. 2 4 How can one expect a person such as George Geary 2 15
to protect the public interest if he must bear the total burden?
If society wishes employees to prevent violations that jeopardize
the public safety and welfare by reporting unsafe products or price
fixing conspiracies, the public must protect and defend the public
advocate.
Yet, as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Pierce v.
Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.,8 6 employees are not private attorneys
general with unlimited authority and discretion; their protection
should therefore be limited. We propose that an employee's reporting of violations should be protected only if the following
three conditions are satisfied: 1) the harm to be caused the public
is serious; 2) the employee first exhausts all in-house steps for
remedying the problem; and 3) the employee has a reasonable
28 7
basis for making his allegations.
Finally, the legislation should establish its own alternative dispute resolution mechanism to reduce expense and discord. This is
necessary to avoid the adversarial relationship between labor and
management which has placed American business at a disadvantage
in the international market 288 as well as the high cost of legal conflict. 2 9 We propose the following system of intercompany dispute
resolution followed by mandatory arbitration as an appropriate
method to accomplish both of these goals. The first level of dispute
resolution should be at the company level and should take the form
of Control Data Corporation's -"0 ombudsman approach, 291 which
284. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, ScIENcE, Dec., 1968, at 124348; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 240, at 82.
285. For a discussion of the Geary case, see notes 211-19 and accompanying
text supra.
286. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
287. DeGeorge, Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: The Pinto Case, 1 Bus. AND PROF. ETHICS J. (1981).
288. See Thomson, supra note 260; Revitalizing the U.S. Economy, supra
note 260, at 56.
289. Center for Public Resources, Dispute Management: A Manual of
Innovative Corporate Strategies for the Avoidance and Resolution of Legal
Disputes (1980).
290. The Control Data Corporation was organized as a Minnesota Corporation on July 8, 1957. It became a Delaware Corporation in 1968 when it
combined with the Commercial Credit Company. It is principally involved
in a worldwide computer business although one of its subsidiaries is also
engaged in finance and insurance. In December 1981, the Control Data
Corporation employed 60,627. 1 MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1216-17 (1980).
291. See Dispute Management, supra note 289, at IV.A.1-A.12.
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has been recently advocated by the Center for Public Resources as a
practical method of employee dispute settlement. Under this proposal the company would appoint an Ombudsman to serve primarily as an advocate for problem resolution and secondarily as an
advocate for the employee when the system fails to provide adequate safeguards. The aggrieved employee is free to contact the
ombudsman at any time. The grievance system would operate
as follows:
1. The employee should talk to his/her manager about
any work-related problems. The manager should know
more about the employee and his/her job than any
other member of management and is in the best position
to handle the work-related problem quickly and satisfactorily. If the employee does not receive an answer
within two working days or if the answer received is not
satisfactory to him/her, then Step 2 should be pursued.
2. The employee should contact his/her Personnel Manager. If the employee does not know who the cognizant
Personnel Manager is, he/she should ask his/her manager
or call the Employee Advisory Resource Ombudsman.
The Personnel Manager will insure that the employee
fully understands the complete Procedure on Employee
Work-Related Problems, discuss the work-related problem
with the employee and attempt to attain a solution. If an
answer satisfactory to the employee is not received within
two working days, the employee should go on to Step 3.
3. The employee should return to the Personnel Manager
and request that the work-related problem be put in writing and a meeting arranged with his/her manager's manager. Within three working days, the Personnel Manager
will accompany the employee to this meeting and assist
him/her in presenting the case. If the answer received at
this step is not satisfactory to the employee, begin Step 4.
4. The employee should return to the Personnel Manager
and request that an interview be set up with the next level
of management, in most cases the Division
General Man29 2
ager, Subsidiary President, or equivalent.
If this grievance system fails to resolve the work-related problem, the employee may request that it be considered by the highest
292. Id. at IV.A. 8-9.
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levels of the company's management. 293 For smaller companies a
more streamlined reconciliation process should be established.
If the disagreement is not successfully resolved at the company
level, we suggest that the following binding, dispute resolution
procedure be utilized. This process was suggested by Professional
Arbitrator Bernard Wray and proffered by the Center for Public
Resources and offers significant advantages in terms of cost and
time. First, the parties would select an individual from a list of
arbiters approved by the state, the federal government or some
other accepted organization. The arbiter would be the presiding
officer at a "mini trial."
The "mini-trial" would proceed as follows:
. Let the case be tried on affidavits without live witnesses.
This would drastically cut hearing time in taking testimony. This procedure has worked well in labor injunction cases in the 4th and 5th Circuits.
. Both sides would have two weeks to submit all affidavits
to the presiding officer and to each other. Both sides
would then have an additional ten days to submit any
rebuttal affidavits.
. One week later, each side would be given one-half day
to present a case. The litigant could have counsel present
his case. The corporate general counsel could have the
vice-president of operations or any other officer of his
choice to aid him.
. No more than fifteen days after the hearing, the presiding officer would write a decision, including findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed remedy. The
written decision would remain secret in perpetuity, and
the presiding officer would be barred from testifying in
any other proceeding involving the matter.
. There would be no post-hearing briefs, motions to
clarify, or any other legal proceedings.
. At any time during the one-day hearing, the presiding
officer would allow the parties to suspend presentation for
penalized with loss of
settlement discussions without being
4
time for presentation of the case.2

The arbiter's fee should be paid by the employer if it loses and
should be divided equally if the employee loses.
293. Id.
294. Id. at IV.B-3.
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Conclusion

The at will employment doctrine, which allows employees to
be terminated at the whim of their employer, is an anachronism.
Borne of a laissez-faire era, it is out of step with contemporary
economic and social theory.

The at will rule can no longer be

justified as necessary to the capitalistic system. The underlying
assumptions of the rule are unsound. Not only is it unrealistic to
assert that labor is freely mobile and that the rule promotes economic efficiency, either at the macro level, or at the level of the
business enterprise, but the social, economic, and psychological
costs of the rule are immense. The at will doctrine imposes a
heavy burden on the employee without a commensurate benefit
to society.
Admittedly, judicial decisions and federal and state statutes
have restricted the at will doctrine in several, albeit limited, areas.
Nonetheless, many employees are not protected from unjust or unfair dismissals because judicial and statutory protection has thus far
been incomplete and often inconsistent. As society evolves, so too
should the legal system. Other advanced industrial countries have
rejected the at will rule and replaced it with a system providing
increased job security under statutes prohibiting dismissal without
cause. The at will rule should similarly be abandoned in the
United States. We have proposed a statutory solution for the individual states that will protect an employee's right to continued
employment and allow dismissal only for just cause. To achieve these
goals, we propose a statute that includes a dual level dispute resolution mechanism that will make it possible to resolve employment
disputes quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively. It is hoped that this
proposal, if adopted, would alleviate the burdens that the at will rule
imposes. It is also hoped that it will protect those individuals who
exercise legitimate rights and perform a public service by providing
them a safe opportunity to protect the public interest. Such a
statute would thrust the doctrines governing the employment relationship into conformity with contemporary economic and social
reality.
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